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We infer debt conservatism behavior by 
examining how REITs adjust towards 
their debt capacity following a capital 
issue or repurchase decision. It is 
observed that REITs with high unused 
debt capacity tend to issue equity which 
renders them more underleveraged for 
at least two consecutive years. These 
high debt buffer REITs also tend to 
converge slowly towards their debt 
capacity through repurchase decisions 
and hold significantly higher unused 
debt facilities than their low buffer 
counterparts. These findings are robust 
to a variety of robustness checks and 
cannot be explained by the traditional 




Debt conservatism refers to a situation where firms maintain a significantly 
lower debt ratio than the optimal debt ratio predicted by the trade-off theory 
of capital structure (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013; Graham, 2000; Myers, 1984). 
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) showed that, on average, 10.2% of the US firms 
during the period 1962-2009 did not have a single debt on their balance sheet. 
Moreover, this phenomenon is persisting whereby 30% of zero leverage firms 
remain debt free for at least five consecutive years. What is striking is that these 
zero leverage firms tend to be profitable, pay high taxes and have high cash 
balances. Similarly, Graham (2000) also showed that firms that maintain low 
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leverage tend to be large, profitable, liquid, in stable industries, and face low 
ex-ante costs of distress.1 This suggests that the low leverage phenomenon is 
a deliberate action of firms not due to their financial constraint status or credit 
rationing imposed by the lenders.
This low leverage puzzle does not go unchallenged. One strand of 
literature argues that firms, in fact, do not underleverage with respect to their 
predicted debt ratio generated from contingent claim models (Morrellec, 2004 
and Ju et al., 2005) and dynamic trade-off models (Hennessy & Whited, 2005 and 
Strebulaev, 2007). Others claim that the tax benefits from incurring  debt might 
not be that high as implied  by the trade-off theory when adjusted for the cost 
of financial distress (Molina, 2005) and non-tax debt shield (Graham & Tucker, 
2006). Minton and Wruck (2001) concluded that debt conservatism is transitory 
after observing that 70% of firms dropped their conservative policy over the 10 
year period. Another strand of literature attempted to explain debt conservatism 
as a rationale decision driven by the need to preserve future financial flexibility 
for potential investments or financing them with risky securities (Fama & 
French, 2002), saving for future financing needs (Viswanath, 1993 and Lemmon 
and Zender, 2010), or having an option to increase leverage (Goldstein, Ju, & 
Leland, 2001). 
In this paper, we complement the literature on underleveraged phenomena 
by examining how firms adjust towards or away from their debt capacity when 
issuing or repurchasing securities. Controlling factors known to affect firms’ 
debt-equity choice, findings of equity issues by firms with high unused debt 
capacity will support debt conservatism behavior because these new issues tend 
to push firms away from their debt capacity that make them more underleveraged. 
Focusing on unused debt capacity also allows us to contrast our hypotheses with 
extant capital structure theories that carry the opposite predictions with respect 
to the relationship between unused debt capital and debt-equity choice. These 
theories predict a positive (negative) relationship between debt (equity) issue 
and unused debt capacity. In other words, firms tend to issue securities that make 
them converge closer to their debt capacity or optimal debt ratio. 
The crux of our empirical strategy is the availability of debt capacity 
measure which is unobservable in practice. For this reason, we focus on samples 
of Malaysia and Singapore REITs with observable debt capacity proxied by the 
regulatory debt limit. This regulatory debt limit is the maximum attainable debt 
limit by REITs in these countries. This debt limit is binding since breaching of 
this regulatory gearing would result in REITs losing their tax-exempt status. The 
regulation does provide some flexibility for REITs to temporarily exceed their 
debt limit due to transient falls in asset value.2 The debt limit was not constant 
during the sample period due to the exogenous regulatory limit increase  from 
35% to 50% (for Malaysian REITs in August 2006) and 60% (for Singapore 
rated REITs in November 2005). Singapore REITs during the study period were 
subjected to two–tier debt limits, i.e. 60% for rated REITs and 35% for unrated 
REITs. Effective from Jan 1st 2016, the Singapore REIT sector has adopted a 
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single 45% debt limit. This observable and heterogeneity debt capacity provided 
"an advantage point to our empirical setting". Unlike previous literature that 
relied on indirect approaches to estimate debt capacity, we could directly observe 
the impact of unused debt capacity on capital structure decisions. The deviation 
of the actual debt ratio from its regulatory debt capacity is explicitly mentioned 
in the Asian REITs’ annual report as an important consideration in their capital 
structure and investment decisions.3 
Apart from its observable debt capacity, REITs’ institutional framework 
makes the traditional capital structure theories less important in explaining 
capital offering choices. Firstly, REITs do not pay corporate taxes. Thus, the 
trade-off theory’s tax based explanation to debt usage becomes irrelevant for 
the REIT sector. Jensen’s (1986) agency costs explanation for using debt is also 
less important as there is not much free cash flow at REIT managers’ disposal in 
the first place due to REIT’s high distribution requirement. Lastly, the pecking 
order explanation is also incomplete since the internal funds are absent from 
REITs’ financing choices. Moreover, REITs’ frequent trips to capital market for 
equity and debt funding also make information sensitivity of financing choices 
(begins with internal funds, then safe debts and finally equity) as postulated by 
the pecking order theory to become less important for REITs than the general 
companies.  
We found support for debt conservatism behavior where high debt buffer 
REITs tend to issue equity that makes them further deviate from their debt 
capacity. This main result is robust to a battery of robustness check implying 
that debt conservatism is the first order priority in capital offering choices. We 
further showed that this debt conservatism behavior persists for a period of at 
least 2 years and is driven by firms operating below their optimal debt ratio. We 
do observe debt convergence in repurchasing decisions. The adjustment pattern 
is asymmetric where high buffer REITs adjust at a slower pace towards their 
debt capacity compared to low buffer REITs. This debt conservatism behavior 
is not influenced by proxies to corporate liquidity/financial constraints and could 
not be explained by trade-off and pecking order theories. Underscoring the 
importance of controlling for debt capacity in this study, we showed that we 
would have wrongly concluded our results as being driven by aggressive debt 
policy had we replaced the debt buffer variable with the actual debt ratio.
Our paper broadly contributes to capital structure literature by explicitly 
taking into consideration the deviation of individual REIT’s actual debt ratio 
from their debt capacities. The two boundaries of debt capacities used in this 
paper also serve to differentiate whether REITs’ debt ratios converge towards 
their optimal debt capacity (trade-off theory) or regulatory debt capacity (pecking 
order theory). Existing papers are generally silent on the roles of debt capacity 
on capital structure decisions. In the case of REITs, for instance, Harrison et al. 
(2011) assumed that high debt ratio is an indication of high debt capacity while 
Riddiough and Steiner (2018) related high debt ratio with low debt capacity.4 
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As pointed out by Lemmon and Zender (2010) these assumptions are prone to 
misclassification of firms with  large debt capacity but high current leverage 
as being financially flexible or firms with small debt capacity but little or no 
leverage as being financially constrained. 
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. The next section presents a 
review of the literature followed by an outline of the research design and data in 
the third section. The fourth section discusses the empirical results with a focus 
on the impact of unused debt capacity on REITs’ capital offering choices while 
the fifth section provides the conclusion. 
2. Literature Review
The literature on firms’ debt-equity choice is well researched. One strand of 
these papers examines the impact of unused debt capacity on firms’ debt equity 
choices. Focusing on unused debt capacity allows researchers to put these 
traditional pecking order and trade-off theory on a “horse race”.5 This is because 
the distance between firms’ actual debt ratio and their debt capacity underpins 
the predictions of both the trade-off and pecking order theories. Firms, according 
to the trade-off theory, should issue debt as long as they are operating below their 
optimal debt ratio. In the case of the pecking order theory, firms should issue 
debt rather than equity as long as they are operating below their debt capacity. 
Myers’ (1977) pecking order theory theorized that high growth firms strive to 
maintain financial slack to avoid issuing equity to meet their future financing 
needs. Financial flexibility, a relatively new explanation to firms’ debt–equity 
choice, prescribed that firms deliberately preserve, drawdown and replenish their 
financial flexibility over time (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Whited, 2011, Byoun, 
2011). This hypothesis also predicts that firms with higher unused debt capacity 
issue more debt in the future. 
De Jong et al. (2011) concluded from their sample of US firms that the 
pecking order theory better describes firms’ issuance decisions where firms 
that exceeded their optimal debt ratio continue increasing leverage until the 
debt capacity is reached. This runs contrary to the trade-off theory’s prediction 
that firms should not incur further debt once they reach their optimal debt ratio. 
Similarly, Hess and Immenkotter (2014) also found the unused debt capacity to 
be positively related to net debt issues. They however, interpreted this result as 
supportive of financial flexibility where firms with high unused debt capacity 
tend to issue more debt. In order to distinguish their results from the trade-off 
theory explanation, they showed that firms reaching their debt capacity and 
with a financing surplus tend to issue equity or pay off debt. This is consistent 
with the financial flexibility motive but inconsistent with the trade-off theory’s 
prediction of no debt reduction since firms already are at their optimal debt 
Debt Conservatism And Debt-Equity Choices: Evidence From Reits’ Unused Debt Capacity: 1-28 5
ratio. In sum, both financial flexibility and the traditional trade-off/pecking 
order theories predict a positive relationship between unused debt capacity and 
debt issues.
As mentioned before, the literature on debt conservatism focuses on the 
extent of underleverage from optimal debt ratio and explains why firms are willing 
to forgo tax benefits of debt. The papers closely related to this study are "those 
on corporate leverage stability". Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) showed 
that corporate leverage is remarkably stable over time; firms with relatively high 
(low) leverage tend to maintain them for over 20 years. One implication of the 
financial stability phenomenon is that the firms’ future offering decisions are 
closely related to their previous leverage ratio. Financial stability predicts that 
firms are less likely to issue material debt if their unused debt capacity was high 
in the earlier period. This is because high buffer (low leverage) firms tend to 
remain so in the near future by issuing a low level of debt. This prediction runs 
contrary to the predictions of the traditional trade-off/pecking order theories and 
the financial flexibility hypothesis discussed above. 
Lemmon et al. (2008) did not however, examine whether the relationship 
between initial leverage and future debt issues is symmetric across high and 
low debt ratios. That is, whether the debt stability phenomenon is driven by low 
leverage firms that choose to become less leveraged (conservative) over time 
by issuing less debt or by high leveraged firms that become more leveraged 
(aggressive) by issuing more debts. A recent study by DeAngelo and Roll (2015) 
showed that debt persistency or stability arises mainly at low leverage and is 
transitory in nature. According to De Angelo and Roll (2015) firms that kept 
a stable debt ratio regime (within +/-5% bandwidth) continuously for 20 years 
were those with a median debt ratio of less than 0.1. These stable regimes are 
however, not common (4.2% of total firms) since for most firms, the debt stability 
phenomenon declines sharply over a 5–10-year horizon. Tracking the practice 
of conservative debt leverage policy, Minton and Wruck (2001) documented 
that 46.8% discontinue their conservative financial policy within a period of 
five years.
In this paper, we attempted to relate the literature on debt conservatism 
with debt equity choices by focusing on the impact of unused debt buffer on 
debt-equity choices. We complement Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) by 
controlling for individual firms’ unused debt capacity. Unlike previous studies 
that relied on indirect methods to derive debt capacity, we used the regulatory 
debt limit which is observable to financial managers’ ex-ante.6 We inferred 
conservatism behavior in debt equity choices based on the difference in direction 
and speed of the adjustment process between high and low debt buffer REITs. 
Our approach allowed us to construct competing hypotheses to distinguish 
conservatism motives from the existing theories discussed above. We also 
supplemented our results with the influence of optimal debt ratio and controlling 
for proxies for corporate liquidity.
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3. Research Design and Data
3.1 Unused Debt Capacity Measures 
We measured individual REITs unused debt capacity as the difference between 
its regulatory debt limit and actual debt ratio. This unused debt capacity or debt 
buffer measures flexibility or financial slack because it indicates how much 
additional debt a REIT could issue before reaching its regulatory debt limit. 
The amount of buffer kept by individual REITs also reflects their debt policies. 
Conservative REITs tend to keep higher debt buffer and it is vice versa for 
aggressive REITs. We also considered a second debt boundary, i.e. optimal debt 
ratio that is widely used in the literature. Optimal debt ratio is the predicted value 
of debt ratios on a set of trade-off variables which includes firm size, firm age, 
profitability and growth opportunities (MB ratio).  
3.2  Empirical Specification
Following Hovakimian et al. (2001) and de Jong et al. (2011), we estimated a 
binary logit model with marginal financing decisions (Marginal) as a function of 
unused debt capacity. This Marginal variable is equal to one for debt issues and 
zero for equity issues. We use quarterly changes in balance sheet information 
to identify debt and equity issues/repurchases. Equity issues (repurchases) are 
defined as increase (decrease) in total capital stock (exclude retained earnings) 
while debt issues (repurchases) correspond to increase (decrease) in total debt. 
The following filters were applied so that only material events were included in 
the sample of financing activities: The sum involved must, firstly, be larger than 
US $5million and the amount must also constitute more than 1% of the REIT’s 
total assets. Cases where REITs issued (repurchased) both debt and equity issues 
were omitted.



















it                    
where Xit-1 and Mit, Pt, Yt are the vectors of firm characteristics, market timing 
variables, property and year dummies respectively, and uit is the residual assumed 
to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero. The vector X contains the controls 
for the  traditional capital structure determinants such as cash holding, firm size, 
firm age, growth opportunities, profitability and asset tangibility. Vector M, on 
the other hand, controls for market timing behavior including past stock returns, 
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interest rate and term structure. These variables capture financial managers’ 
market timing behavior by taking advantage of the relative costs of debt and 
equity capital in raising capital. We mitigated the reverse causality concern 
by lagging all firm-level explanatory variables. The construction of all of the 
variables used in this study is detailed in Appendix A. The correlation matrix in 
Appendix B indicates minimal problem with multicollinearity.
We only elaborate here the predictions for issuing decisions since the 
predictions of repurchasing decisions follow the same logic albeit with the 
opposite sign. Traditional capital structure theories (pecking order and trade-off) 
and financial flexibility predict a positive α
2
 where REITs with higher unused 
debt buffer in the previous period are more likely to issue debt in the current 
period. This is consistent with the idea of debt convergence towards either an 
optimal debt ratio (trade-off) or debt capacity (pecking order). The financial 
flexibility hypothesis also predicts a positive coefficient α
2 
indicating REITs 
make use of the financial slack (debt buffer) they preserved in the previous period 
to issue more debt in the current period.  A negative α
2
 in hand is consistent with 
the prediction of financial stability where firms that maintain a lower (higher) 
debt buffer in the previous period tend to remain as such in the next by issuing 
lesser debt (higher equity). 
In order to discern debt conservatism behavior, we allowed for the 
differential of α
2 
in Equation (1) to vary between high and low debt buffer 
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where D
t-1
 High buffer (D
t-1
 Low buffer) is a dummy variable equal to one if debt 
buffer is above (below) the median value of debt buffer in the sample and zero 





whether REITs are moving towards or away from their target debt ratio. The 
basic premise of debt conservatism behavior is that firms would opt for financing 
choices that make them deviate further (below) from their debt capacity, hence, 
making them carry more unused debt capacity. Empirically, we expect REITs 
with higher debt buffer to either deviate more from their debt capacity than 
low buffer REITs (α2<0 & α2< α3) or to converge at a slower rate than their 
low buffer counterparts towards debt capacity (α2>0 & α2<α3).  Notice that we 
did not require REITs to adjust until they reached the debt capacity since this 
is maximum debt boundary of debt ratio. A move towards or away from debt 
capacity would suffice for us to infer debt conservatism behavior.
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3.3  Data 
Our sample was a quarterly panel data set of Singapore and Malaysian listed 
REITs during the period 2003 to 2015. The financial data and stock prices used 
in this research were obtained from Bloomberg’s database. Individual REIT’s 
unused debt facilities were extracted from annual reports and converted to 
quarter using the linear interpolation method.7 We avoided survivorship bias 
by including both active and delisted REITs that appeared in Bloomberg’s 
database.8 The variables used in the regression analysis were winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile to avoid the influence of extreme observations. After omitting 
observations with missing values REITs, the unbalanced panel data consisted 
of 1344 firm-quarter observations covering 54 REITs publicly traded between 
2003:Q1 and 2015:Q4. This sample contained a total of 569 security issues and 
475 security repurchases defined as in Hovakimian et al. (2001) and de Jong et 
al. (2011) mentioned above.
3.4  Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study. 
On average, REITs are less likely to issue (45.0%) and repurchase (40.6%) 
debt than equity. The prevalence of equity issues despite the fact that all REITs 
are operating below their regulatory capacity provides a crude test to reject the 
pecking order theory which hypothesizes firms to issue equity only when they 
have used up their debt capacity. Regulatory buffer is distributed symmetrically 
across the sample of REITs with the sample mean and the median equal to 
22.2% and 23.1% respectively of the total assets on the back of the average 
regulatory debt limit of 52.3%. Our measure of debt buffer was higher than 
the estimated buffers of 16.2% and 17.2% reported by, respectively, de Jong, 
Verbeek and Verwijmeren (2012) and Hess and Immenkotter (2012) using credit 
rating regression models. The mean debt ratio of 30.1% was substantially lower 
than 52% documented by Giacomini et al. (2017) for US REITs for the period 
1990-2012. The average optimal debt ratio of 29.6% indicated firstly, REITs 
were operating near their optimal debt limit and secondly, optimal limit was 
the first debt boundary for REITs before the regulatory limit which was the 
maximum boundary.
Unused private and public debts constituted of 4.6% and 13.8% of 
the total assets respectively. The mean cash holdings were low at 2.7% while 
tangible assets were high at 92.4% of REITs’ total assets due to the regulatory 
structure of REIT. The average firm size was US$1.52 billion. REITs in our 
sample were relatively young with an average age of 5.3 years as REIT sector 
only began to flourish in Asia in the early 2000s. The average Tobin’s, a proxy 
to firm value was approximately 0.81 times with a range of 0.37 to 1.29. In 
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terms of profitability, a typical REIT averaged 1.5% (6.0% p.a.) as measured 
by ROA. As for the market timing variables, the average stock performance of 
6.1% represented the price appreciation of individual REIT stocks over the last 
six months. Term structure spread averaged 1.4% implying an upward sloping 
yield curve. The relative interest rate of 1 time over the average interest rate in 
the past one year implied a generally stable interest rate regime.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Median Std.Dev Min. Max.
Capital Offerings
Debt-equity issues 0.450 0 0.498 0 1
Debt-equity repurchases 0.406 0 0.492 0 1
Debt Variables
Debt buffer 0.222 0.231 0.109 -0.037 0.600
Debt limit (capacity) 0.523 0.500 0.090 0.350 0.600
Debt ratio 0.301 0.319 0.102 0 0.579
Optimal debt ratio 0.296 0.299 0.053 0.128 0.441
Unused private debts 0.046 0.021 0.063 0 0.297
Unused public debts 0.138 0 0.212 0 0.884
Firm Characteristics
Cash holdings 0.027 0.018 0.031 0.000 0.196
REIT size 1,520.50 990.00 1,610.61 39.52 8,094.89
REIT age 5.310 4.704 3.690 0.499 21.022
Tobin’s Q 0.806 0.822 0.182 0.366 1.287
ROA 0.015 0.011 0.020 -0.056 0.115
Asset tangibility 0.924 0.957 0.110 0.397 0.996
Market Timing 
Stock performance 0.061 0.046 0.219 -0.514 0.915
Term structure 1.400 1.256 0.551 -0.045 2.650
Interest rate 0.999 1.049 0.351 0.108 2.343
Note. The descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables was based on a full sample of 1344 firm-
quarter observations with 54 individual REITs. Total observations for unused private and public 
debts were 1,276 each due to missing value problem. Except for actual debt ratio, debt buffer and 
optimal debt ratio, all control variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% level. We used the 
logarithm of REIT size and REIT age for regression analysis. 
Figure 1 presents the time series evolution of the average debt ratio and 
debt limit during Q1:2003 to Q4:2015. We observed a dramatic surge in debt 
buffer from 8.8% in 2004 to 21.0% in 2006 due to an increase in the regulatory 
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debt limit for REITs in Singapore and Malaysia from 35% to 60% (for rated 
REITs) and 50%, respectively. REITs clearly chose to maintain debt ratio at a 
range which was comfortably well below the regulatory debt limits so that they 
could access external financing without any constraints. The relatively stable 
debt ratio masked REITs’ deliberate actions in enlarging their debt capacity. 
Four out of six Singapore REITs obtained credit rating within 1 year after the 
regulatory limit change in 2005 to tap into the additional debt capacity afforded 
by the existence of a credit rating. Moreover, 44% of rated Singapore REITs that 
had the option to leverage up to 60% chose to keep their leverage ratio below the 
first hurdle of 35% as in Dec 2015. 
Figure 1. The Evolution of Debt Ratio and Regulatory Debt Limit
Figure 2 shows that high buffer REITs (above sample median) consistently 
maintain higher unused private debt capacity (mainly bank lines of credit) than 
low buffer REITs (below sample median) every year during the sample period. 
This reflects over-conservatism in debt policy since REITs need to pay annual 
fees (based on total lines size) and commitment fees (based on unused private 
debt) for maintaining this standby facility (Hardin and Hill, 2011). These results 
also suggest REITs that keep a higher debt buffer are not constrained in their 
access to external financing. In other words, low leverage is not an outcome of 
credit rationing by the lenders. 
We also observed similar pattern in unused public debts in Figure 3. 
Except for years 2006, 2011 and 2012, unused public debts were higher for 
high buffer REITs than low buffer REITs. Not reported here, the mean test of 
difference for unused private/public debts was significant at the 5% level between 
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the high and low buffer subsamples. Note that we only showed in Figures 2 and 
3 unused private and public debts from year 2005 onwards since there was no 
observation for subsample above the sample median debt buffer for years 2003 
and 2004. In sum, these descriptive results suggest debt conservatism behavior 
where REITs prefer to operate significantly below their regulatory debt limit 
and at the same time, maintain a huge sum of unused debt facilities to back this 
unused debt capacity. 
Figure 2. Unused Private Debts by Debt Buffer
Figure 3. Undrawn Public Debts by Debt Buffer
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4. Results
4.1  Main Findings
Table 2 presents the results of the logit regressions. Robust t-stats clustered 
by firms (Peterson, 2009) are reported in parentheses below the regression 
coefficients. Models 1-2 are debt-equity issue regressions while Models 3-4 are 
debt-equity repurchase regressions. Model 1 shows a strong significant negative 
(positive) relationship between debt (equity) issues and debt buffer. This finding 
provides strong evidence against the trade-off/pecking order/financial flexibility 
theories that predict a positive relationship between the probability of debt issue 
and previous period debt buffer.  This finding is however, in line with Lemmon 
et al.’s (2008) financial stability hypothesis which posits that firms that carry low 
leverage (high buffer) tend to remain as such by issuing more equity (debt) in the 
future. In REITs, Harrison et al. (2011) also documented a negative relationship 
between lagged leverage and debt ratio and debt issuance events which the 
authors interpret as evidence of substantial level of stability within a REIT’s 
capital structure from period to period.
Model 2 examines whether the impact of debt buffer on debt-equity choice 
is symmetric between high and low buffer REITs. We do this by decomposing 
debt buffer variables into those that are above sample median (Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D 
high buffer) and those that are below sample median (Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D Low buffer). The 
coefficient of Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D high buffer is negative and strongly significant while 
the coefficient of Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D Low buffer is insignificant. These results suggest 
that the deviation from debt capacity is driven by high buffer REITs that chose 
to issue equity over debt, making them more underleveraged rather than by low 
buffer REITs that aggressively issue debt which push them nearer to their debt 
capacity.
With regard to repurchasing decisions in Model 3, the negative coefficients 
of debt buffer variables suggest debt convergence towards the debt capacity. 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) also found firms moving towards their target debt ratio 
via repurchase instead of issuing decisions. These authors suggest that firms 
have more discretion when repurchasing existing capital than in raising new 
capital. This might  be relevant to the REITs sector that is known to use bank 
lines of credit or equity to finance investment and subsequently refinance these 
debt/equity with public debt of  longer maturity when the timing and pricing 
is right (Brown & Riddiough, 2003; Ooi et al., 2012). Repurchase decisions 
are therefore, likely used by REITs to reconfigure firm capital structure, while 
issuing decisions are driven by investment needs. This conjecture is supported 
by the positive and significant MB ratio, a proxy to growth opportunities that is 
positive and significant in issuing decisions but not in repurchasing decisions. 
Model 4 shows that convergence is larger in magnitude for low buffer REITs 
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than high buffer REITs suggesting that high buffer REITs move much slowly 
towards their debt capacity compared to their low buffer counterparts.9 
Three out of the four control variables are significant in the issuance 
equation and are in the direction predicted by the trade-off theory where financially 
constrained REITs (smaller, younger and lesser cash holdings) prefer to issue 
more equity over debt to avoid the cost of financial distress. The positive and 
significant coefficient of MB ratio is in line with the pecking order’s prediction 
that firms with the greatest degree of information (high growth opportunity) 
have incentives to issue debt over equity. Market timing variables (stock 
performance, term structure and interest rate) do not exert significant influence 
on issuance choices though the signs are consistent with the implication of this 
theory. Specifically, REITs appear reluctant to issue debt when market interest 
rates and/or risk premiums are high, as well as when past stock performances 
have been strong. These market conditions however, appear to play an important 
role in repurchasing decisions. REITs are significantly more likely to repurchase 
debt when risk premiums and interest rates are high and when their stocks are 
highly valued. The significance of this market timing variables adds credence to 
our claim that repurchases are initiated to reconfigure capital structure, taking 
advantage of capital market conditions. The only firm characteristic variable 
that is significant in the repurchasing equation is asset tangibility. The positive 
relationship is inconsistent with the collateral value of tangible real assets that 
should, all else being equal, lead to reduced probability of debt repurchase due 
to increasing REITs’ capacity to borrow more.
4.2  Robustness Checks
This section provides several robustness checks to the main results in Table 2. 
First, despite the short panel of our sample data, we re-estimated the logistic 
regression using GLS random effects and firm fixed effects. Second, we used 
quarterly change in debt ratio scaled by total assets as the dependent variable. 
Third, we used an alternative method to classify debt buffer variables, i.e. 
dummy variables equal to one for debt buffer at the top and bottom 10% of the 
sample. This classification allowed us to directly test our claim that the negative 
coefficient Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D High buffer in Table 2 is driven by REITs’ high buffer 
REITs that chose to issue equity instead of debt. 
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Table 2. The Impact of Debt Buffer on Debt-Equity Choice
Debt vs. Equity issue Debt reduction vs. Equity 
repurchase
Explanatory variables Model 1       Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 0.705 0.737 -3.853*** -3.760***

















-10.073** -10.251*** 0.011 -0.013
(-2.53) (-2.57) (0.00) (-0.00)
REIT Size 
t-1
-0.621* -0.650* 0.380 0.389
(-1.77) (-1.90) (0.93) (0.93)
REIT Age 
t-1
0.515*** 0.523*** 0.149 0.119
(3.29) (3.30) (0.87) (0.68)
ROA 
t-1
-4.472 -4.319 -5.210 -5.296
(-0.75) (-0.72) (-0.78) (-0.80)
Asset Tangibility 
t-1
-0.602 -0.608 1.384* 1.547*
(-0.67) (-0.68) (1.69) (1.85)
MB ratio 
t-1,
1.884** 1.828** -0.595 -0.546
(2.10) (1.98) (-0.69) (-0.63)
Stock Performance 
t,
-0.823 -0.813 1.685*** 1.638***
(-1.39) (-1.38) (3.39) (3.29)
Term Structure 
t
-0.357 -0.359 1.280*** 1.261***
(-1.52) (-1.53) (3.60) (3.53)
Interest Rate 
t,
-0.062 -0.055 0.468* 0.425
(-0.26) (-0.23) (1.71) (1.58)
Singapore REIT 0.480 0.504 -0.566 -0.591
(0.98) (1.06) (-1.42) (-1.47)
Year &  Property Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of REITs 51 51 52 52
No of Obs 564 564 470 470
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
Notes. We estimated a logit model for REITs’ debt-equity choices. The dependent variables for 
models 1 and 2 (3 and 4) were designed to equal one for debt issues (repurchases) and zero for equity 
issues (repurchases). Cases where firms issued (repurchase) both material debt and equity issues 
were omitted. The cut-offs for material debt/equity issues were that the issues need to be larger than 
US$5 million and constitute 1% of total assets. T-statistics which appear in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
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The results reported in Panels A and B demonstrate that the main findings 
of this paper are robust across different econometric and empirical specifications. 
Our main findings that high buffer REITs tend to deviate away from their debt 
capacity in issuing decisions and converge at a slower pace to their debt capacity 
than low buffer REITs remain intact. Panel C provides strong support to our 
claim that the deviation from debt capacity is driven by high buffer REITs (Top 
10% buffer) that chose to issue equity instead of by low buffer REITs (Bottom 
10% buffer) that chose to issue debt. 
Table 3. Robustness Check
Debt vs. equity 
issue
Debt reduction vs. 
Equity repurchase
Δ Debt/total assets
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Panel A: Fixed effects
Debt Buffer 
t-1




*D Low buffer -5.796** -3.947 -0.115**
(-2.40) (-1.38) (-2.36)
No of Obs 558 459 1344
Panel B: Random effects
Debt Buffer 
t-1




*D Low buffer -3.650* -3.823* -0.081**
(-1.79) (-1.70) (-2.24)
No of Obs 569 474 1344
Panel C: Pooled
Top 10% buffer -0.992*** 0.319 -0.019***
(-2.60) (0.98) (-5.64)
Bottom 10% buffer 0.192 0.092 0.014**
(0.50) (0.32) (2.04)
No of Obs 564 470 1344
Notes. We re-estimated our results using the same set of control variables in Table 2. Models 1-2 
were estimated with the logistic regression method (fixed/random/pooled) while Model 3 was 
estimated with panel regression (fixed/random/pooled). T-statistics that appear in parentheses. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
4.3 Persistence (Stability) of Debt Conservatism Behavior
This section addresses the question of whether debt conservatism behavior is 
persistent. Similar in spirit with Lemmon et al. (2008), we extended the lag 
value of capacity buffer one year at a time up to five years prior to a debt/
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equity issuance decision. We expect the impact of capacity buffers on future 
capital issues/repurchases to be short-lived and weaken as we increased the lag 
period of the debt buffer variables. Table 4 reports the regression results using 
the specification in Models 2 and 4 in Table 2 for issuing and repurchasing 
decisions, respectively. The results show that REITs’ debt-equity issue choices 
are influenced by their previous debt buffer up to a period of two years. The 
coefficient for low buffer REITs’ flip to positive in year 5 indicates that debt 
ratios are converging. The impact of debt buffer in debt-equity repurchases was 
short-lived where we did not document any significant relationship beyond 1 
quarter period.
Table 4. Persistency of Debt Conservatism Behavior






Debt vs. Equity issue
Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D High buffer -3.178*** -2.795** -1.023 -2.841* -0.357
(-3.00) (-2.56) (-0.83) (-1.88) (-0.26)
Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D Low buffer -1.034 -1.509 -0.132 -3.904 3.335
(-0.56) (-0.87) (-0.06) (-1.41) (1.18)
Debt reduction vs. Equity repurchase
Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D High buffer -0.922 -1.116 0.477 0.929 0.505
(-0.64) (-0.77) (0.33) (0.58) (0.24)
Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D Low buffer -3.663 -2.419 3.674 0.727 -5.371
(-1.51) (-1.05) (1.51) (0.25) (-1.24)
Notes. We re-estimated our results with lagged value of debt buffer up to five years using the same set 
of control variables in Table 2. T-statistics that appear in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
4.4  Ruling Out Alternative Explanations
Having provided evidence in favor of the debt conservatism behavior, we now 
present additional tests to rule out the alternative explanations, i.e. financial 
flexibility, trade-off and pecking order theories.
4.4.1  Financial flexibility hypothesis
Figures 2 and 3 indicate that REITs with high buffer tend to stockpile financial 
flexibility via unused debt facilities. This section analyses whether REITs tap 
into this flexibility when issuing debt. To explore this possibility, we included 
the interaction terms of debt buffer variables with unused debt facilities. For 
the financial flexibility hypothesis to be valid, we expect both the unused 
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debt facilities variables and their interactions with debt buffer to be positively 
(negatively) and significantly related to debt issues (repurchases). Conversely, 
insignificance of these coefficients would indicate conservatism where REITs 
do not capitalize on their debt capacity despite being backed by standby credit 
facilities. As shown in Table 5, none of these interaction variables are found to 
be significant in issue and repurchase equations. The coefficients of debt buffer 
variables remain intact with the inclusion of these interaction variables while 
they turn insignificant in the repurchase equation. These findings imply that 
financial flexibility in the form of unused debt facilities cannot account for the 
debt conservatism phenomenon.
In unreported results, we also experimented with proxies to financial 
constraints such as cash holding, firm size, the existence of a credit rating and 
growth opportunities proxied by Tobin’s Q ratio (Lemmon & Zender, 2010; 
de Jong et al., 2011). Financially constrained firms (low cash holdings, small 
size, no credit rating and high growth opportunities) might be restricted in debt 
issuing decisions that move them towards debt capacity. If this is indeed the 
case, we should observe negative and significant coefficients on the interaction 
terms of financial constraints with debt buffer variables. Again, our key findings 
remained intact even after controlling for the interaction terms. The coefficients 
of Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D High buffer remain negative and statistically significant (1%-
5%) while none of the Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D Low buffer coefficients are significant. 
Except for Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D High buffer*Tobin’s Q, none of the debt buffer-
financial constraints’ interaction terms were found to be significant. The positive 
coefficient was inconsistent with the implication of financial constraints. These 
findings collectively imply that REITs’ debt conservatism behaviour are not due 
lack of access to external financing. It is rather a deliberate action to remain 
conservative.
4.4.2  Trade-off and pecking order theory
Following de Jong et al. (2011), we split the full sample into subsamples with 
debt ratios that were above and below their optimal debt ratio. We focused on 
regions where both theories agree/disagree to examine whether these theories 
are strong predictors of our data. In issuing decisions, both trade-off and 
pecking order theories predict firms to keep issuing debt until they reach the 
optimal debt ratio. Once firms are above their optimal debt limit, firms are 
hypothesized to issue equity according to the trade-off theory while the pecking 
order theory hypothesizes firms to keep raising debt until they reach their debt 
capacity. Empirically, these theories predict a positive debt buffer coefficient for 
observations below the optimal debt limit and negative (for trade-off theory) or 
positive (for pecking order theory) for regions above the optimal debt limit. For 
robustness sake, we report results using two different proxies for the optimal debt 
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ratio. The first proxy is the predicted value of debt ratio regression as a function 
of size, age, profitability, growth opportunities and property type dummies, 
estimated using pooled and fixed effects estimation methods. The second proxy 
is industry average debt ratio measured as average debt ratio of seasoned REITs 
(at least two observations) in the same country of origin. 
Table 5. Ruling Out Financial Flexibility Hypothesis
Debt vs. Equity issue Debt reduction vs. 
Equity repurchase
Explanatory variables Model 1       Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 0.410 1.101 -4.388*** -4.621***
(0.24) (0.70) (-2.86) (-3.75)
Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D High buffer -4.150*** -5.187*** -1.387 -1.598
(-3.22) (-3.71) (-1.21) (-1.22)
Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D Low buffer -2.488 -4.608* -3.660* -2.896
(-1.02) (-1.75) (-1.77) (-1.29)
Unused private debts 2.304 -1.941
(0.49) (-0.39)










Unused public debts -1.708 -1.831
(-1.22) (-1.38)










No of Obs 532 532 564 532
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11
Notes. As before, we re-estimated using the same set of control variables in Table 2. T-statistics that 
appear in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, 
respectively.
The issuing results in Table 6 do not support the predictions of trade-
off/pecking order theories. The coefficients of debt buffers remain negative and 
significant in subsamples of high buffer REITs that are below their optimal debt 
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limit across two different proxies of the optimal debt ratio. These results are 
against the predictions of the trade-off/pecking order theory but are consistent 
with that of debt conservatism.  The findings that deviation from debt capacity 
is driven by high buffer REITs that operate below their optimal debt limit 
strengthens the credibility of our debt conservatism behavior in the prior section.
Table 6. Ruling Out Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories
Debt vs. Equity issue Debt reduction vs. Equity 
repurchase
Explanatory variables <=Optimal 




limit              
>Optimal 
limit
Panel A: Pooled optimal limit 
Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D High buffer -5.546** -3.488* -2.265 0.605
(-2.08) (-1.78) (-1.13) (0.42)
Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D Low buffer -7.531 -1.810 -4.188 -0.241
(-1.45) (-0.68) (-1.09) (-0.12)
No of Obs 273 291 219 247
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.23 0.09
Panel B: Fixed effects optimal limit
Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D High buffer -4.058* -3.120 -0.543 -2.570
(-1.84) (-1.16) (-0.33) (-1.10)
Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D Low buffer -1.507 -3.922 -2.371 -2.460
(-0.35) (-1.30) (-0.70) (-0.86)
No of Obs 296 266 234 230
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.11 0.23 0.11
Panel C: Industry optimal limit
Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D High buffer -5.149** -2.002 1.633 -2.437
(-1.96) (-0.99) (0.73) (-1.17)
Debt Buffer 
t-1
*D Low buffer -0.408 -2.448 2.237 -4.225*
(-0.07) (-0.78) (0.61) (-1.67)
No of Obs 236 318 162 289
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 0.24 0.09
Notes. In accordance with de Jong et al. (2011), we split the sample into debt buffer that were above 
and below the optimal debt limit. As before, we re-estimated using the same set of control variables 
in Table 2. T-statistics that appear in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
In repurchase decisions, when debt ratio is below its optimal debt limit, 
the pecking order model predicts firms to repurchase debt while the trade-off 
theory predicts firms to increase leverage (buy back equity). When debt ratio 
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exceeds its optimal debt limit, both these theories predict firms to buy back debt. 
Empirically, this implies either a positive (pecking order) or negative (trade-off) 
coefficient in the regions below optimal debt limit and a positive coefficient 
for both theories for the subsample above the optimal debt limit. None of the 
coefficients of debt buffer variables in Table 6 are significant and carry signs that 
suggest the validity of these theories. The sign and coefficients values, as in the 
full sample, suggest that high buffer REITs adjust slower than low buffer REITs 
towards their debt ratio.
4.5  Does Regulatory Debt Limit Really Matter?
In this section, we examined whether regulatory debt limit which forms the 
main thrust of this paper indeed matters. We did this by replacing the debt 
buffer variables with the actual debt ratios. As before, we defined D Low leverage 
(D High leverage) as dummy equal to one for observations below (above) the sample 
median, and zero otherwise. If the debt limit is not binding, we should observe 
the same debt conservatism behavior we observed in Table 2, albeit in opposite 
signs. Specifically, the positive relationship between leverage and debt issues is 
driven by low leverage REITs that choose to issue equity over debt and a slower 
debt adjustment towards debt capacity by low leverage REITs than their high 
leverage counterparts.
Table 7 of Model 1 shows that high leverage REITs tend to issue more 
debt and are more likely to repurchase debt; findings that do not differ from debt 
buffer results in Table 2. However, when the samples are separated according 
to the level of leverage, the results are revealing. Models 2 and 3 show that 
ignoring debt limit leads us to conclude that the deviation in Model 1 is driven by 
high leverage REITs that chose to issue more debt than by low leverage REITs 
that issued more equity. Similarly, we conclude in the repurchase equation that 
low leverage firms adjust towards debt capacity by increasing debt ratio (via 
stock repurchases) much faster than debt reductions (via debt repurchases) made 
by high leverage REITs. In sum, these results suggest that debt limit indeed 
matters, as ignoring it leads to us to conclude that debt conservatism is of second 
order importance in capital structure decisions.
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Table 7. Does Regulatory Debt Limit Really Matter?
Debt vs. Equity issue Debt reduction vs. Equity 
repurchase











*D High leverage 4.824*** 2.879**
(3.16) (2.12)
Bottom 10% debt ratio 
-1.465** -1.202**
Top 10% debt ratio (-2.21) (-1.96)
0.899*** 0.223
Year &  Property Fixed Effects Yes Yes (3.44) Yes Yes (1.03)
No of REITs 51 51 51 52 52 52
No of Obs 564 564 564 470 470 470
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12
Notes. The regression models are exactly the same as in Table 2 except that we replaced debt 
buffer variables with the actual debt ratio. T-statistics that appear in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
5. Conclusion
This paper shows that conservatism behavior is a first-order consideration in 
firms’ debt-equity choices. Our approach differs from most previous papers 
as it focuses on REITs’ debt adjustment process towards/away from their debt 
capacity subject to individual REITs’ debt buffer.  We found that compared to 
low buffer REITs, high buffer REITs tend to issue more equity that render them 
to deviate further from debt capacity and move much slower towards their debt 
capacity through equity repurchases. These main results are robust to a battery 
of robustness checks and are not influenced by firms’ access to capital and level 
of financial constraints. Taking advantage of the two debt boundaries of this 
study, we further show that our results are not driven by the traditional trade-off 
and pecking order theories and the relatively new financial flexibility hypothesis. 
Moreover, we illustrate that the main results are driven by high buffer REITs 
that operate below their optimal debt limit, a finding that could only be explained 
by debt conservatism behavior. We also contribute to capital structure literature 
by showing the importance of controlling for individual firms’ debt capacity. 
Ignoring debt capacity leads us to wrongly conclude that firms are adopting an 
aggressive debt policy.
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Findings of debt conservatism for Asian REITs should not come as a 
surprise for two reasons. First the tax shield benefits as postulated by the trade-
off theory is absent from the REIT sector. In theory, REITs should have zero 
or very low leverage (Howe & Shilling, 1988). Second, the literature on debt 
conservatism has shown that entrenched managers or firms with managerial–
friendly corporate governance structure have preference for low debt ratio to 
avoid monitoring and scrutiny by the lenders (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013). 
Asian REITs’ externally managed structure fit into this description where REIT 
assets are managed by an external party outside REITs. This conflict of interest is 
however, mitigated by the fact that the external party is owned by REIT sponsors 
who are also the major shareholders of REITs.10 We leave it to future research to 
explore factors leading to Asian REITs’ preference for conservative debt policy 
and how this, in turn, affects their investment policy and firm valuation.11
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Appendices
Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Variables Definitions
Debt buffer The difference between regulatory debt limit and actual debt 
ratio.
Debt ratio Total debt scaled by total assets.
Debt limit SREIT=35% or 60% (rated REITs); HREIT=45%; 
MREIT=50%.
Unused private debts Undrawn bank lines of credit & other banking facilities (term 
loans, trade facilities) scaled by total assets.
Unused public debts Untapped MTN programme scaled by total assets.
Cash holdings Cash & cash equivalent scaled by total assets.
REIT size Book value of total assets in US$ million.
REIT age Number of years since the REIT’s initial public offering.
Tobin’ Q Market value of equity minus the book
value of equity plus total assets
scaled by total assets.
ROA Net income scaled by total assets.
Asset tangibility Ratio of real estate investment scaled by total assets.
Stock performance Price appreciation of individual REIT stocks over the last 6 
months.
Term structure Difference between yields of 10-year and 1-year government 
bonds.
Interest rate 10-Year government bond yield relative to the average yield 
over the
preceding four quarters.
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End Notes
1 Strebulaev and Yang (2013) estimated that zero leverage firms in their 
sample forego on average 15.6% of their market value by operating below 
their optimal debt ratio. Graham (2000), on the other hand, estimated a 
7.3% increase in firm value if firms in their sample were leveraging up after 
adjustment for personal taxes.
2 Three REITs (7 firm-quarter observations) that exceeded their debt limit 
during the study period swiftly reduced their debt ratio in the next period.   
3 “The private placement in November 2012 improved CMT’s financial 
capacity and flexibility, with gross proceeds of approximately S$250.0 
million raised from the issue of 125.0 million new units. The net proceeds, 
together with part of the amounts raised from fixed rate notes issuances, 
will be used to refinance CMT’s debts due in 2013. This will reduce CMT’s 
aggregate leverage and enhance the trust’s debt headroom.”(CapitalMall 
Trust 2012 annual report)
4 Exceptions are Giacomini et al. (2017) and Ooi et al. (2010) who controlled 
for deviation of actual debt ratio from the optimal debt ratio in REITs’ capital 
structure decisions. They found support for the trade-off theory where REITs 
that exceeded their target debt ratio tend to engage in leverage decreasing 
activities.  
5 Briefly, the trade-off theory is based on the premise that firms trade-off 
between the marginal benefits of issuing debts in the form of tax-shield and 
the marginal costs due to bankruptcy risks (Modigliani & Miller, (1958, 
1963)). The pecking order theory, on the other hand, is based on the premise 
that there exists information asymmetry between managers and the market. 
This leads to a pecking order of securities, such that firms issue security in 
the order of their information sensitivity, beginning with internal funds, safe 
debts and reluctantly, equity when firms have used up the other two financing 
options (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
6 The three main indirect approaches to compute debt capacity are firstly, the 
credit scoring regression approach which estimates the maximum debt ratio 
a firm could reach before it loses its investment grade rating (De Jong et al., 
2012) or the debt ratio that causes the firm to downgrade one notch from its 
respective rating category, e.g. AAA to AA (Hess & Immenkotter, 2014). 
The second approach is Leary and Robert’s (2010) boundary of debt capacity 
deduced from firms’ debt ratios after equity or debt issues. It is based on 
the pecking order theory’s prediction that firms will only issue equity once 
they have used up their debt capacity. Thirdly, firm’s optimal debt ratio as 
a proxy for debt capacity is estimated by running a regression of actual debt 
ratio on a set of trade-off variables. One main shortcoming of these indirect 
approaches is that the estimated debt capacity is unobservable to financial 
28                              The International Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 13. Number 1, 2017: 1-28
managers in reality. Researchers exploring the link between unused debt 
capacity and firms’ corporate financing decisions implicitly assume that 
financial managers know their debt capacity ex-ante.  
7 Specifically, if the unused debt facilities in the fiscal year ending in 2014 is 
equal to $45m and year 2015 is equal to $105m, we assume the unused debt 
facilities to increase linearly by $15m in each quarter such that it is equal to 
$60m in Q1:2015; $75 in Q2:2015 $90 in Q3:2015 and $105m in Q4:2015.
8 There is one delisted REIT (Al-Hadharah Boustead REIT) in the sample.
9 The differences in high and low buffer estimates are significant at the 10% 
level indicated by F-test p-value.
10 See Wong et al. (2013) and Downs et al. (2016) for a discussion of the 
conflict of interest in externally managed REIT structure.
11 Nguyen and Schüßler (2016) documented a negative and significant 
relationship between debt ratio and stock returns for firms in the UK and 
Germany which is consistent with the positive value of financial conservatism.
